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Abstract—In this paper, relay selection is considered to enhance
security of a cooperative system with multiple threshold-selection
decode-and-forward (DF) relays. Threshold-selection DF relays
are the relays in which a predefined signal-to-noise ratio is set
for the condition of successful decoding of the source message.
We focus on the practical and general scenario where the
channels suffer from independent non-identical Rayleigh fading
and where the direct links between the source and destination and
source and eavesdropper are available. Based on channel state
information knowledge, three relay selection strategies, namely
traditional, improved traditional, and optimal, are studied. In
particular, the secrecy outage probability of all three strategies
are obtained in closed-form. It is found that the diversity of
secrecy outage probability of all strategies can improve with
increasing the number of relays. It is also observed that the
secrecy outage probability is limited by either the source to relay
or relay to destination channel quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
To secure the broadcast nature of wireless communication
against eavesdroppers, physical layer security has gained much
prominence [1]. Motivated by recent advances in cooperative
communication systems [2], employing the cooperative tech-
nique to enhance physical layer security of wireless systems
has recently been receiving significant research interest. Com-
pared to multi-relay assisted transmission, relay selection in
which a single relay among all possible candidates is selected
for relaying a source’s signal has been shown to optimize
system resource utilization, such as power and bandwidth,
while maintaining the same diversity order.
Relay selection to improve secrecy in cooperative communi-
cation system has received considerable attention recently [3]–
[13]. The relays considered in these works are conventional
amplify-and-forward (AF) or decode-and-forward (DF) relays
[2]. In all these works, relay selection is performed depending
on the availability of the instantaneous channel state infor-
mation (ICSI) or statistical channel state information (SCSI)
of the links. Based on the knowledge of ICSI or/and SCSI,
the following three cases have been considered mostly for
the relay selection problem. Case i): when the ICSI of the
source to relay and relay to destination is known. In this case,
the selected relay is the one which achieves the maximum
rate through the source-relay-destination channel, which is
described as the main channel in physical layer security. We
refer to this as traditional relay selection (TS). Case ii): in
addition to the ICSI of source to relay and relay to destination,
the SCSI of the relay to eavesdropper channels are known.
This is an improvement over the previous case and we refer
to it as improved traditional selection (ITS). Case iii): when the
ICSI of all links are known. In this case, the relay selected is
the one which provides maximum secrecy rate. We refer to this
as optimal selection (OS). In practise, the ICSI of the various
links can be acquired using one of the techniques described
in [14] and the references therein.
With the notable exception of [12], [13] and [15], most
of the existing work on physical layer security in DF relay
cooperative systems has only considered the high signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) regime for the source to relay link. This is
not very practical as fading can severely degrade the channel
quality of a link in wireless communication systems. In [12],
the source to relay link quality is taken into account by
considering that the rate at the destination is limited by the
minimum of the source to relay and relay to destination
rate. In [13], the set of successful relays which recover the
source symbol are those for which the source to relay link
rate is above a minimum threshold rate. Furthermore, only
[13] has considered the existence of direct links from source
to destination and source to eavesdropper. However, in this
work, all the links are assumed to experience independent and
identical Rayleigh fading. Though the identical distribution
assumption makes the analysis more tractable, it may not
be valid for practical wireless communication applications
because, in general, the relays are not closely placed in real
environments. Moreover, only the TS scheme is studied in [13]
and the relay selection problem is not tackled in [15].
With this motivation in mind, in this paper, we study relay
selection to enhance security of a cooperative system with
multiple threshold-selection DF relays. In threshold-selection
relaying scheme for DF cooperation protocol, the possible
candidate relays for selection are those for which the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) is above a predefined threshold [16]. We
consider the more practical scenario where the direct links
between the source to destination and source to eavesdropper
exist and where the links experience independent but not
necessarily identically distributed Rayleigh fading. The main
contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
1) We study three relay selection strategies, depending on
the ICSI and SCSI knowledge to enhance the secrecy
outage probability of threshold-selection relaying.
2) We derive the secrecy outage probability in closed-form
for the most general case of independent but non-identical
channels.
3) We obtain the secrecy outage assuming direct links from
source to destination and source to eavesdropper.
In detailing our contributions, we observe that the studied
relay selection strategies can increase the diversity order of
secrecy outage probability with increasing the number of
relays. Interestingly, we also observe that the secrecy outage
probability can not be increased beyond a certain level if either
the source to relay or relay to destination channel quality is
kept fixed while the other is increased.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model. Section III evaluates the secrecy
outage probability for the relay selection strategies. Section
IV discusses the results, and finally, Section V concludes the
paper.
Notation: P[·] is the probability of occurrence of an event,
EX [·] defines the expectation of its argument over the random
variable (r.v) X , (x)+ , max(0, x) and max (·) denotes the
maximum of its argument, FX(·) represents the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the r.v X , and fX(·) is the
corresponding probability density function (PDF).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model consists of one source (S), one desti-
nation (D), one passive eavesdropper (E), and N DF relays
(Rk, k ∈ {1, 2, · · ·N}), as shown in Fig. 1. All nodes are
equipped with a single antenna. The relays are half-duplex in
nature, and hence, complete information transmission takes
place in two time slots. S broadcasts its message in the
first time slot. We assume that the relays are threshold-
selection DF type [16]; in other words, they correctly decode
the received message and retransmits in the second time
slot only if their SNR is above a threshold, γth. The SNR
threshold, γth, can be properly chosen to achieve the goal of
correct decoding. The channels are modeled as independent
non-identically distributed flat Rayleigh fading. Both D and
E utilize maximal ratio combining (MRC) technique to get
the advantage of two copies of same signal from the direct
transmission and the relayed transmission. The received SNR,
γxy , of any arbitrary x-y link from node x to node y can be
expressed as γxy =
Px|hxy|
2
N0y
, where x and y are from the
set {S,R,D,E} for any possible combination of x-y, x 6= y.
Px is the transmit power from node x and N0y is the noise
variance of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at node
y. As hxy is assumed Rayleigh distributed with average power
unity, i.e., E[|hxy|
2] = 1, γxy is exponentially distributed with
mean 1/λxy = Px/N0y . The CDF of γxy can be written as
Fγxy (z) = 1− exp(−λxyz), z ≥ 0.
For simplicity, we further denote the parameters of the S-E
and Rk-E links which are terminating at E as λSE = αse and
λRkE = αke, respectively. Parameters of the other links which
are conveying messages towards D, i.e., S-Rk or Rk-D, are
denoted by λSRk = βsk and λRkD = βkd, respectively.
E
DS
Rk
R
1
R
N
Fig. 1. System model with multiple threshold-selection DF relays.
The achievable secrecy rate of the system is [1]
CS ,
1
2
[
log2
(
1 + γM
1 + γE
)]+
, (1)
where γM and γE are the main channel and eavesdropper
channel SNR at D and E, respectively. The term 1/2 reflects
the fact that two time slots are required for information
transfer.
The secrecy outage probability of the system represents the
probability that the achievable secrecy rate is less than a target
secrecy rate, Rs, and is expressed as
Po (Rs) = P [CS < Rs] = P [γM < ρ (1 + γE)− 1] , (2)
where ρ = 22Rs .
III. SECRECY OUTAGE OF RELAY SELECTION
Let us assume that S is a set representing the relays which
are able to decode successfully at the first stage. A relay is
to be selected from this particular set by a relay selection
rule in the second stage. The secrecy outage probability of the
system with relay selection, Po(Rs), can be mathematically
represented as
Po(Rs) =
N∑
K=0
∑
P[S]P So (Rs), (3)
where P[S] represents the probability of occurrence of a
particular set S containing K relays, and P So (Rs) represents
the secrecy outage probability for a given relay selection
rule. The second summation in (3) must be performed for(
N
K
)
possible combinations. It should be noted that P[S] and
P So (Rs) can be evaluated independently, as they are the result
of independent events.
Now let us assume that the relays which are unable to
exceed γth constitute the set S¯. P[S] can be easily evaluated
by multiplying the probability of occurrence of S and S¯. With
the probability that a particular relay k is in S given by
P[γsk > γth] = exp(−βkdγth), (4)
P[S] can be evaluated as
P[S] =
K∏
∀k∈S
exp(−βskγth)
N−K∏
∀j∈S¯
(1− exp(−βsjγth)). (5)
When S is the empty set, there exists only the direct link to
D and E from S. In this case, the secrecy outage probability
can be obtained from (2) as
P So (Rs) = 1−
αse exp (−βsd(ρ− 1))
ρβsd + αse
. (6)
When S contains a single relay, the secrecy outage probability
is obtained by using γM = γsd + γkd and γE = γse + γke.
The γM and γE distributions can be readily found for different
parameters of the exponential r.vs as [17]
fX(x) = B1e
−λ1x + B2e
−λ2x, (7)
where B1 =
λ2λ1
λ2−λ1
, B2 =
λ2λ1
λ1−λ2
. λ1 and λ2 are the
parameters of the two independent exponentially distributed
r.vs, with λ1 6= λ2. Thus, the secrecy outage probability can
be obtained from (2) as
P So (Rs) = 1−
βsdαkeαse exp (−βkd(ρ− 1))
(βsd − βrd)(ρβkd + αre)(ρβkd + αse)
−
βkdαkeαse exp (−βsd(ρ− 1))
(βrd − βsd)(ρβsd + αre)(ρβsd + αse)
. (8)
A. Traditional Selection (TS)
The traditional relay selection rule does not take into ac-
count the Rk-E channel quality for all k. This scheme selects
the relay which achieves the highest rate through the Rk-D
link, as successful decoding has already been performed in the
first stage. The highest rate is achievable on the link having
highest instantaneous SNR.
The secrecy outage probability of the traditional rule cor-
responding to S can be evaluated using the law of total
probability as
P So (Rs) =
K∑
∀k∈S
P [Relay = Rk]P
[
CkS < Rs
]
=
K∑
∀k∈S
P
[
γkd > γ
−
kd
]
P
[
1 + γkd + γsd
1 + γke + γse
≤ ρ
]
=
K∑
∀k∈S
P
[
γ−kd < γkd ≤ (ρ− 1) + ρ (γke + γse)− γsd
]
,
(9)
where CkS is the secrecy outage probability for the kth relay in
S, γ−kd = max{γid}, where ∀i ∈ S and i 6= k, is the maximum
SNR between all relays which are not selected from S by the
relay selection rule. The distribution f
γ
−
kd
(y) is expressed as
[12]
fγ−
kd
(y) = −
K−1∑
m=1
(−1)
m
∑′
m
β′me
−yβ′m , (10)
where
∑′
m is defined as
∑′
m
=
K−(m−1)∑
i1=1
i1 6=k
K−(m−2)∑
i2=i1+1
i2 6=k
· · ·
K−1∑
im−1=im−2+1
im−1 6=k
K∑
im=im−1+1
im 6=k
,
(11)
and β′m =
∑m
l=1 βild. To further evaluate the probability in
(9), let us assume a new r.v, X = γke+ γse. As all r.vs in (9)
are independent, the solution can be written in integral form
as
P So (Rs) =
K∑
∀k∈S
(I1 + I2) , (12)
where
I1 =
∫ ∞
(ρ−1)
∫ ∞
z−(ρ−1)
ρ
∫ λ
0
∫ λ
y
fγkd(t)fγ−
kd
(y)fX(x)
× fγsd(z)dtdydxdz, (13)
I2 =
∫ (ρ−1)
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ λ
0
∫ λ
y
fγkd(t)fγ−
kd
(y)fX(x)
× fγsd(z)dtdydxdz, (14)
and λ = ρ− 1 + ρx− z.
In deriving (12), x, y, and z represent the realizations of X ,
γ−kd, and γsd, respectively. The distribution fγ−
kd
(y) is given in
(10), while the distribution of the r.v X is given in (7). The
integration limits are due to following reasons: i) γ−kd should
be always less than λ; hence, y takes values from zero to λ,
ii) none of the r.vs can take negative values, and hence, when
γsd exceeds (ρ − 1), X is higher than (z − (ρ − 1))/ρ in
(13), iii) when γsd is below (ρ − 1), X has positive values;
hence, the corresponding integral is from zero to infinity in
(14). Final expressions of I1 and I2 are given in (20) and
(21), respectively.
B. Improved Traditional Selection (ITS)
Traditional relay selection can be improved by using the
statistical channel knowledge of the Rk-E link, αke, in (9) to
obtain P So (Rs), as follows
P So (Rs)
=
K∑
∀k∈S
P
[
γkd
1/αke
>
(
γkd
1/αke
)−]
P
[
1 + γkd + γsd
1 + γke + γse
≤ ρ
]
=
K∑
∀k∈S
P
[
γkd >
γ−M
αke
]
P [γkd < (ρ− 1) + ρ (γke + γse)− γsd]
=
K∑
∀k∈S
(I3 + I4), (15)
where
γ−M =
(
γkd
1/αke
)−
= max
i∈S
i6=k
{
γid
1/αie
}
= max
i∈S
i6=k
{γidαie} , (16)
and I3 and I4 are expressed in (22) and (23) respectively. The
PDF of γ−M can be easily obtained as in (10), with β
′
m =∑m
l=1 βild/αle.
I3 and I4 can be integrated to I3 = −
K−1∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑′
m(P11+
P12 − P13) and I4 = −
K−1∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑′
m(P21 + P22 − P23),
respectively, where P11, P12, P13, P21, P22, P23 are given in
(24) to (29).
It is worth mentioning that (24) to (29) are valid for
(αkeβ
′
m+βkd) 6= βsd and βkd 6= βsd. When either (αkeβ
′
m+
βkd) = βsd or βkd = βsd, the analytical expressions can be
similarly found after slight modifications.
C. Optimal Selection (OS)
Optimal selection takes into account both main channel and
E channels quality. The relay is selected for which the secrecy
rate is maximum, and
P So (Rs) = P
[
max
∀k∈S
{
1 + γkd + γsd
1 + γke + γse
}
≤ ρ
]
. (17)
The above probability can be evaluated first for given γse and
γsd, and then by averaging over them. In this case, (17) can
be written as a product of individual probabilities
P So (Rs) = EγseEγsd
[
K∏
∀k∈S
P
[
1 + γkd + γsd
1 + γke + γse
≤ ρ|γse, γsd
]]
= EγseEγsd
[
K∏
∀k∈S
P [γkd ≤ (ρ− 1) + ρ (γke + γse)
−γsd|γse, γsd]] = I5 + I6, (18)
where I5 and I6 are expressed in (30) and (32), respectively,
with λ = ((ρ− 1)+ρ (x+ y)−z), and x, y and z are realiza-
tions of the r.vs, γke, γse, and γsd respectively. The solution
of I5 and I6 are provided in (31) and (33), respectively, with∑
m defined as [12]
∑
m
=
K−(m−1)∑
i1=1
K−(m−2)∑
i2=i1+1
· · ·
K−1∑
im−1=im−2+1
K∑
im=im−1+1
.
(19)
We also define β′m =
k∑
l=1
βild, A
′
k =
k∏
l=1
Ail and Ak =
αke exp (−βkd(ρ−1))
ρβkd+αke
.
IV. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
This section describes numerical and simulation results.
Unless otherwise mentioned, 1/βsd = 3 dB, 1/αse = 2 dB,
γth = 3 dB, N = 4, and R = 1 bits per channel use (bpcu).
In Fig. 2, the secrecy outage probabilities of the se-
lection schemes TS, ITS and OS are plotted versus av-
erage SNR, 1/β, for different rate requirements, Rs =
1, 2 bpcu. Non-identical link parameters are considered,
with 1/βsk = 0.2/β, 0.6/β, 0.4/β, 0.8/β, 1/βsk =
0.8/β, 0.4/β, 0.6/β, 0.2/β, whereas 1/αke = 0, 3, 6, 9
dB, respectively, for k = 1, · · · , 4. As expected, OS works
the best, followed by ITS, and TS is the worst. Additionally,
it is worth noting that as Rs increases, the secrecy outage
probability deteriorates.
Fig. 3 depicts the secrecy outage probabilities of the selec-
tion schemes TS, ITS and OS for two different γth values, i.e.,
γth = 0, 15 dB. It is assumed that the S-Rk and Rk-D link
qualities are identical, i.e., 1/βsk = 1/βkd = 0.5/β, while the
Rk-E link qualities are non-identical, i.e., 1/αke = 0, 3, 6, 9
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus average SNR for different Rs
values when links are non-identical. Solid lines are used for Rs = 1 bpcu
and dash lined for Rs = 2 bpcu.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus average SNR for different SNR
threshold values at the relays. Solid lines are used for γth = 0 dB and dash
lined for γth = 15 dB.
dB for k = 1, · · · , 4. The secrecy outage probability deterio-
rates with the increase in γth. Higher values of γth reduces the
number of relays available for selection, hence the observation.
In Fig. 4, the secrecy outage probabilities of the selection
schemes TS, ITS and OS are plotted versus the average SNR
for increasing number of relays from N = 1 to N = 4. Iden-
tical link qualities are assumed as 1/βsk = 1/βkd = 0.5/β
and 1/αke = 3 dB for all k, respectively. It is clear that the
performance improves as the number of relays increase. The
slope of the curves also increases with increasing the number
of relays, which means that the diversity order of the secrecy
outage probability improves with N . An important observation
is that the improvement obtained by increasing the number of
relays follows the laws of diminishing return. Furthermore,
as the Rk-E link qualities are identical for all k, the ITS
selection scheme can not provide better performance than the
TS selection scheme and merges with TS. It is worth noting
that the performances of the TS and ITS schemes do not merge
in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively.
Fig. 5 shows the secrecy outage probabilities of the selection
schemes TS, ITS and OS when the links S-Rk and Rk-D
are unbalanced. Two cases are considered, as follows: Case
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P
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability versus average SNR for different N
values. Solid lines are used for TS, dash lines for ITS, and dash-dot lined for
OS.
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus average SNR for unbalanced S-Rk
and Rk-D links. Solid lines are used for 1/βkd = 20 dB and dash lined for
1/βsk = 10 dB.
1, when 1/βkd = 20 dB and 1/βsk = 1/β, and Case 2,
when 1/βsk = 10 dB and 1/βkd = 1/β, for k = 1, · · · , 4.
The results are obtained assuming identical eavesdropper link
qualities, 1/αke = 3 dB, for all k. It is observed that
the secrecy outage probability saturates to a particular value
depending on the values of 1/βsk or 1/βkd. This indicates that
either link S-Rk or Rk-D, for all k, can limit the the secrecy
outage probability. Furthermore, it can be observed that when
1/βsk = 10 dB, the performance of the relay selection
schemes saturates to the same value, while the performance
saturates to different values when 1/βkd = 20 dB. When
the S-Rk link quality improves, the number of relays that
exceed γth increases. As the relay selection schemes can take
increased advantage when there are more relays to choose
from, performance saturates to different values in Case 1
depending on the selection scheme.
It should be noted that, in all figures, simulation results
are in agreement with numerical results. This validates our
analysis in Section III.
V. CONCLUSION
Three relay selection schemes, namely traditional, improved
traditional, and optimal are proposed to enhance the secrecy
outage probability using threshold-selection DF relays. The
secrecy outage probability is derived in closed-form assuming
the most practical scenario of independent but non-identical
fading channels and including direct links from the source to
destination and eavesdropper. It is found that by increasing
the number of relays, the diversity gain of the secrecy outage
probability can be increased. On the other hand, higher SNR
threshold at the relays can decrease the secrecy performance.
It is observed that the improved traditional relay selection
can outperform the traditional relay selection only if the
eavesdropper links are non-identical. It is also noticed that
the secrecy outage probability is limited by either the source
to relay or the relay to destination link quality.
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I1 = −
N−1∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑′
m
B1βsd exp(−βsd(ρ− 1))
αse/ρ + βsd
[
β′m
αse (β′m + βkd)
+
βkd
(β′m + βkd) (ρ (β
′
m + βkd) + αse)
−
1
ρβkd + αse
]
−
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(−1)m
∑′
m
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αke/ρ + βsd
[
β′m
αke (β′m + βkd)
+
βkd
(β′m + βkd) (ρ (β
′
m + βkd) + αke)
−
1
ρβkd + αke
]
. (20)
I2 = −
N−1∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑′
m
B1
[
β′m (1− exp (−βsd(ρ− 1)))
αse (β′m + βkd)
−
βsd exp(−βkd(Rs − 1)) (exp((βkd − βsd)(Rs − 1)) − 1)
(ρβkd + αse) (βkd − βsd)
+
βsdβkd exp(−(βkd + β
′
m)(ρ − 1)) (exp((βkd + β
′
m − βsd)(ρ − 1)) − 1)
(β′m + βkd) (ρ (β
′
m + βkd) + αse) (β
′
m + βkd − βsd)
]
−
N−1∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑′
m
B2
[
β′m (1− exp (−βsd(ρ− 1)))
αke (β′m + βkd)
−
βsd exp(−βkd(Rs − 1)) (exp((βkd − βsd)(Rs − 1)) − 1)
(ρβkd + αke) (βkd − βsd)
+
βsdβkd exp(−(βkd + β
′
m)(ρ − 1)) (exp((βkd + β
′
m − βsd)(ρ − 1)) − 1)
(β′m + βkd) (ρ (β
′
m + βkd) + αke) (β
′
m + βkd − βsd)
]
. (21)
I3 =
∫
∞
ρ−1
∫
∞
z−(ρ−1)
ρ
∫ αkeλ
0
∫ λ
y/αke
fγkd (t)fγ−
M
(y)fX (x)fγsd (z)dtdydxdz. (22)
I4 =
∫ ρ−1
0
∫
∞
0
∫ αkeλ
0
∫ λ
y/αke
fγkd (t)fγ−
M
(y)fX(x)fγsd (z)dtdydxdz. (23)
P11 =
βsdαkeβ
′
m exp(−βsd(ρ − 1))
αkeβ′m + βkd
[
B1
αse (αse/ρ+ βsd)
+
B2
αke (αke/ρ+ βsd)
]
. (24)
P12 =
βsdβkd exp(−βsd(ρ− 1))
αkeβ′m + βkd
[
B1
(αse/ρ+ βsd) (ρ(αkeβ′m + βkd) + αse)
+
B2
(αke/ρ+ βsd) (ρ(αkeβ′m + βkd) + αke)
]
. (25)
P13 = βsd exp(−βsd(ρ − 1))
[
B1
(αse/ρ+ βsd) (ρβkd + αse)
+
B2
(αke/ρ+ βsd) (ρβkd + αke)
]
. (26)
P21 =
αkeβ
′
m
αkeβ′m + βkd
(1− exp(−βsd(ρ − 1))) . (27)
P22 =
βsdβkd exp(−(αkeβ
′
m + βkd)(ρ− 1))
αkeβ′m + βkd
[
B1
(ρ(αkeβ′m + βkd) + αse)
+
B2
(ρ(αkeβ′m + βkd) + αke)
]
×
exp(−(αkeβ
′
m + βkd − βsd)(ρ − 1)) − 1
(αkeβ′m + βkd − βsd)
. (28)
P23 = βsd exp(−βkd(ρ− 1))
[
B1
(ρβkd + αse)
+
B2
(ρβkd + αke)
]
exp ((βkd − βsd) (ρ − 1)) − 1
(βkd − βsd)
. (29)
I5 =
∫
∞
0
∫
∞
ρy+(ρ−1)

 K∏
∀k∈S
(∫
∞
z−ρy−(ρ−1)
ρ
∫ λ
0
fγkd (t)fγke (x)dtdx
) fγsd (z)fγse (y)dzdy (30)
=
βsdαse(∑N
k=1 αke/ρ+ βsd
)
(ρβsd + αse)
N∏
k=1
ρβkd
ρβkd + αke
. (31)
I6 =
∫
∞
0
∫ ρy+(ρ−1)
0

 K∏
∀k∈S
(∫
∞
0
∫ λ
0
fγkd (t)fγke (x)dtdx
) fγsd (z)fγse (y)dzdy (32)
= 1−
αse exp(−βsd(ρ− 1))
ρβsd + αse
+
N∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑
m
[
A′mβsdαse exp ((β
′
m − βsd)(ρ − 1))
(β′m − βsd)(ρβsd + αse)
−
A′mβsdαse
(β′m − βsd)(ρβ
′
m + αse)
]
. (33)
